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ABSTRACT
Various approaches can be used to construct a model from a null distribution and a test statistic. I prove
that one such approach, originating with D. R. Cox, has the property that the p-value is never greater
than the Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR). When combined with the general result that the GLR is never
greater than any Bayes factor, we conclude that, under Cox’s model, the p-value is never greater than any
Bayes factor. I also provide a generalization, illustrations for the canonical Normal model, and an alternative
approach based on sufficiency. This result is relevant for the ongoing discussion about the evidential value
of small p-values, and the movement among statisticians to “redefine statistical significance.”
1. Outline
This is a brief contribution to the ongoing discussion about the
evidential import of a small p-value (see, e.g., Wasserstein and
Lazar 2016). Let X ∈ X be a set of observables, andH0 : X ∼ f0
be a null distribution. A “significance procedure” for H0 is any
statistic p0 : X → R such that p0(X ) under H0 stochastically
dominates a uniform distribution. If p0 is a significance proce-
dure for H0, then p0(xobs) is a “p-value” for H0, where xobs are
the observations of X . The usual way to construct a significance
procedure is to propose a test statistic t : X → R. Then
p0(x) := Pr0{t(X ) ≥ t(x)} (1)
is a significance procedure according to the Probability Integral
Transform, where Pr0 is the probability under H0. For more on
these definitions see, for example, Casella and Berger (2002,
sec. 8.3) and Lehmann and Romano (2005, chap. 9). The dis-
tinction between a “procedure” and a “value,” which I have
taken fromMorey et al. (2016), is very useful in practice.
The critical issue is whether it is advisable to dismiss the
null distribution on the basis of a small p-value, without
explicitly considering any alternatives. The article addresses
this issue by producing and justifying an “embedding model”
based on the null distribution and the test statistic, in which
the null distribution is at one end of the parameter space of
the embedding model (Section 2). Within this embedding
model
p0(x) ≤ G01(x) ≤ B01(x), (2)
where G01 is the Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) and B01 is
the Bayes factor. It follows from these inequalities that evidential
thresholds for Bayes factors or GLRs translate into evidential
thresholds for p-values. For example, if we accepted Harold
Jeffreys’s threshold that B01(x) = 10−3/2 ≈ 0.032 separates
“strong” from “very strong” evidence against the null distribu-
tion, then p0(x) ≤ 0.032 would be the most lenient possible
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threshold for p-values designed to detect “very strong” evidence
against the null distribution. This is less than the conventional
threshold of p0(x) ≤ 0.05, but not by much; although even a
small difference would have a substantial impact in some fields
(Masicampo and Lalande 2012).
On the other hand, for a specific null distribution and test
statistic, we can construct the embedding model and evaluate
the exact relationship between the p-value and the GLR. In the
canonical case where the embedding model is Normal (Section
3), a p-value of 0.05 corresponds to a GLR of 0.259, and aGLR of
0.032 corresponds to a p-value of 0.004. So in this case, accept-
ing Jeffreys’s threshold would lead to p0(x) ≤ 0.004 as the most
lenient possible threshold for p-values. This is close to the sug-
gestion of p0(x) ≤ 0.005, made by Johnson (2013). This thresh-
old of p0(x) ≤ 0.005 has recently been advocated by a large
group of statisticians (Benjamin et al. 2018), and questioned by
another large group of statisticians (Lakens et al. 2018).
Section 4 provides a different justification for (2) via the suffi-
ciency of the test statistic in the embedding model, which holds
when the components of X are independent and identically
distributed (IID).
2. D. R. Cox’s EmbeddingModel
The attraction of a significance procedure is that it does not
require amodel forX within which the null distribution is a sin-
gle element. Any attempt to link p-values with GLRs and Bayes
factors must produce such a model based, as far as possible,
only on the ingredients to hand: the null distribution and the
test statistic. Clearly these two components are insufficient, and
some additional principle must be used to justify any particular
choice.
One principle is to assume that the test statistic t was care-
fully chosen to reflect the question of interest. This suggests an
embedding model for X in which t is an unambiguously good
choice for testingH0 versus “notH0,” as was originally proposed
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by D. R. Cox, in Savage et al. (1962, p. 84) and Cox (1977). Cox
proposed the exponentially tilted embedding model
f (x; θ ) = f0(x) · e
θ ·t(x)
MT (θ )
, θ ≥ 0, (3)
whereMT is the moment generating function of t(X ) underH0.
This model has a monotone likelihood ratio in t(x), and hence
the test statistic t is uniformly most powerful (UMP) in testing
H0 : θ = 0 versusH1 : θ > 0 (see, e.g., Casella and Berger 2002,
sec. 8.3).
This is a “sufficient” argument for (3) as the embedding
model; that is, were (3) the model, then t would be the analyst’s
unambiguous choice of test statistic for H0 versus “not H0.” But
it is also hard to imagine a simpler way to create an embedding
model out of just f0 and t , and this might be a more practical
justification for (3). However, Section 4 presents another justifi-
cation with strong intuitive appeal. I will refer to (3) as the “ET”
(exponentially tilted) embedding model.
Initially, consider the Bayes factor for H0 versus H1,
B01(x) := f0(x)∫∞
0 f (x; θ ) π(θ ) dθ
, (4)
where π is some prior distribution on θ ∈ (0,∞). Adopting the
approach originally proposed by Edwards, Lindman, and Savage
(1963, p. 228), the Bayes factor can be bounded below over the
set of all possible priors,
B01(x) ≥ inf
π
f0(x)∫∞
0 f (x; θ ) π(θ ) dθ
(5)
= f0(x)
supθ>0 f (x; θ )
=: G01(x),
whereG01 is theGLR. This simple result is true for every embed-
ding model. But then, using the ET embedding model in (3),
G01(x) = inf
θ>0
f0(x)
f (x; θ )
= inf
θ>0
e−θ ·t(x) MT (θ )
≥ Pr0{t(X ) ≥ t(x)}
= p0(x) (6)
according to Chernoff ’s inequality (e.g., Whittle 2000, chap. 15).
Chernoff ’s inequality is an application of Markov’s inequality,
and therefore in principle it is tight, but in practice an equality
would be very unusual for a statistical model. One exception is
when the components of X are IID and t(x) = x1 + · · · + xn, in
which case (6) is asymptotically exact; this is a result from Large
Deviation Theory (see, e.g., Whittle 2000, chap. 18).
Putting the inequalities (5) and (6) together, (3) implies (2).
Thus, if the embeddingmodel is the ET embeddingmodel, then
the p-value for H0 is never greater than the GLR for H0 versus
H1, which is never greater than the Bayes factor for H0 versus
any alternative in the embedding model. It is superficially
puzzling that two constructions which seem fundamentally
different can be ordered by their values. But, on the one hand,
the modern definition of a significance procedure p0 implies
that p0(y) ∈ (0,∞), just like a Bayes factor. On the other hand,
the ET embedding model ensures that B01(y) ∈ [0, 1], just like
a probability.
Figure . The GLR and Wilks’s p-value. The gray region shows the possible values
of p0 under the ET embedding model given in (), and the solid line the values of
Wilks’s p-value, based on the asymptotic distribution of −2 logG01(X ) under the
null distribution.
Curious readers will be wondering how close Wilks’s p-value
is to its upper bound ofG01(x), under the ET embeddingmodel.
Wilks’s theorem states that
− 2 logG01(X ) D−−−→ χ21 under H0 and (3), (7)
if the components of X are IID (plus other technical conditions:
see, e.g., Casella and Berger 2002, sec. 10.3). Thus, each value of
G01(x) can be mapped to a p-value for H0:
p0(x) = Pr{χ21 ≥ −2 logG01(x)}, (8)
where p0 is an approximate significance procedure for finite
n. Figure 1 shows the result: a Wilks’s p-value of 0.05 corre-
sponds to a GLR of 0.146. In other words, the IID and n → ∞
conditions on X have reduced the p-value by as much as 10 per-
centage points. As this example illustrates, it is always pertinent
to ask whether it is the observations or the conditions which
produce a small p-value.
Finally, note that the ET embedding model can be general-
ized to
f (x;φ) ∝ f0(x) · eφ·h(t(x)), φ ≥ 0, (9)
for any increasing hwithout t losing its UMPproperty, for which
(6) still holds, and (2) likewise. H replaces T , and the final step
is
Pr0{h(t(X )) ≥ h(t(x))} = Pr0{t(X ) ≥ t(x)} = p0(x) (10)
because h is increasing. Therefore, the ET embedding model is
more properly thought of as a class of embedding models, and
the inequalities in (2) hold for every embedding model in the
class.
3. Illustration: The Normal Model
To illustrate both inequalities in (2), consider the canonical
statistical model, first analyzed in this context by Edwards,
Lindman, and Savage (1963, p. 228). Let the null distribution be
X ∼ N(0, σ 2) for known σ , where I take σ = 1 for simplicity
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Figure . The Generalized Likelihood RatioG01 and possible Bayes factors B01 (gray
region), as functions of the p-value p0, for the null distribution X ∼ N(0, 1) and the
test statistic t(x) = x, which is a UMP one-tailed test for location.
and without loss of generality. Let the test statistic be t(x) = x.
Then the ET embedding model is X ∼ N(θ, 1), for which
H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ > 0 is a conventional one-tailed test
for location. The GLR is
G01(x) =
{
1 x ≤ 0
e−
1
2 x
2
x > 0.
(11)
The p-value is a deterministic function of x, from which it is
possible to plot G01, the lower bound for B01, as a deterministic
function of p0, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 also shows some specific values: the lower bound on
B01(x) when p0(x) = 0.05, and the value of p0(x) correspond-
ing to a lower bound of B01(x) = 10−3/2 ≈ 0.032, which is the
boundary between “strong” and “very strong” evidence against
H0 in the scheme of Jeffreys (1961, see Appendix B). In this
example, a p-value at the conventional threshold of 0.05 corre-
sponds to a lower bound on the Bayes factor of 0.259: “Even the
utmost generosity to the alternative hypothesis cannot make the
evidence in favor of it as strong as classical significance levels
might suggest” (Edwards, Lindman, and Savage 1963, p. 228).
From the other direction, the necessary condition for satisfying
Jeffreys’s boundary is p0(x) ≤ 0.004. Jeffreys’s boundary is only
a convention, but the sizable absolute discrepancy between
the two points in Figure 2, on either scale, casts doubt on the
advisability of dismissing the null distribution for a p-value of
about 0.05.
In this illustration, the null distribution, test statistic, and ET
embedding model combined can give a UMP one-tailed test for
location. It is natural to ask whether a different choice of test
statistic can give a two-tailed test for location, but the answer
must be negative because there is no UMP two-tailed test for
location (see, e.g., Casella and Berger 2002, sec. 8.3). It fol-
lows that “two-tailed” test statistics might have unexpected ET
embedding models.
To illustrate, if t(x) = x2, which is large in both tails of the
null distribution, then the ET embedding model is equivalent
to
X ∼ N(0, 1 + θ ), (12)
Figure . Similar to Figure , except based on the “two-tailed” test statistic
t(x) = x2 , which is a UMP one-tailed test for dispersion.
showing that x2 is a UMP one-tailed test for dispersion. The
GLR for this model is
G01(x) =
{
1 |x| ≤ 1
|x| · e− 12 (x2−1) |x| > 1. (13)
The relationship between the p-value and the GLR is shown
in Figure 3. This figure carries a similar message to Figure 2,
which is that there is a large difference between the p-value
and the Bayes factor. A p-value at the conventional threshold
of 0.05 corresponds to a lower bound on the Bayes factor of
0.473, which is very weak evidence against the null distribution.
The necessary condition for satisfying Jeffreys’s condition of
B01(x) ≤ 0.032 is p0(x) ≤ 0.001, to three decimal places.
In both of these illustrations, we could have chosen non-
linear increasing functions of the test statistic to use in the ET
embedding model. For example, x3 in the first illustration, and
x4 in the second. This changes the ET embedding model, and
therefore the implicit hypothesis test for which t(x) is UMP. It
also changes the GLR. But it does not change the p-value, and
it does not change the result that the p-value is never greater
than the GLR (see the end of Section 2). The absolute size of the
gap between the p-value and the GLR can only be assessed with
respect to a specific choice of test statistic.
4. Justification via Sufficiency
The weakness of the argument in Section 2 is that it relies on
exponential tilting to construct the embedding model given in
(3), or its generalization in (9), and it loses its force when the
analyst does not think that exponential tilting is appropriate.
There is an another argument which can be applied in the case
where the components of X are IID. The crux of this argument
is to arrive at (9) using a sufficiency principle.
We require a one-dimensional version of the Pitman–
Koopmans–Darmois (PKD) theorem, which was originally
sketched in Fisher (1934), with a modern proof in Schervish
(1995, sec. 2.2.3). This theorem validates the following result
(plus some technical conditions not given here). If
1. the components of X are IID,
2. the support of the embedding model is constant, and
3. the test statistic is sufficient in the embedding model,
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then
f (x;φ) ∝ f0(x) · eφ·h(t(x)), (14)
where h is invertible, and the boundary condition f (x; 0) =
f0(x) has been imposed. To orient thismodel so that large values
of the test statistic challenge the null distribution, we take φ ≥ 0
and h increasing, similar to (9). Then the argument in Section 2
goes through exactly as before.
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